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LENDER LIABILITY UNDER

CERCLA:

SEARCH FOR A SAFE HARBOR
by
Michele Beigel Corash* and Lawrence Behrendt**

UNTIL

the 1985 decision of United States v. Mirabile,' few people

understood the potential magnitude of lender liability for environmental cleanup, particularly for cleanup of hazardous substances 2
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 3 Prior to 1985, lending institutions rarely considered
environmental risks in evaluating and negotiating loan transactions. 4 After
* Partner of Morrison & Foerster and head of the firm's environmental practice. Ms.
Corash served as General Counsel of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency during the
years when CERCLA was enacted.
** Partner of Morrison & Foerster. Mr. Behrendt heads the commercial lending practice
in the firm's Orange County office.
This article has benefitted greatly from the knowledgeable input and assistance of Robert
Reinhard and Elizabeth Kruis, to whom the authors express their thanks.
1. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985) [hereinafter Mirabile];see
infra notes 4347 and 60-65 and accompanying text.
2. A discussion of the dangers posed by hazardous waste, and the extent of hazardous
waste contamination in the United States, has been well documented elsewhere and is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the hazardous waste crisis, see UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE WASTE SYsTEM (1988); UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING AHEAD
(1987); J. HIGHLAND, HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL-AssESSING THE PROBLEM (1982); S.

EPSTEIN, L. BRowN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE INAMERICA (1982).
3. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988)). The
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat.
1613-1782 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988)), amended CERCLA in 1986. On the
subject of lender liability under CERCLA, see these recent law review articles: Gieser, Federal
and State Environmental Law: A Trap for the Unwary Lender, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 643
(1988); James, FinancialInstitutions and Hazardous Waste Litigation: Limiting the Exposure
to Superfund Liability, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329 (1988); King, Lenders' Liability for
Cleanup Costs, 18 ENVTL. L. 241 (1988); Klotz & Siakotos, Lender Liability Under Federal
andState EnvironmentalLaw: Of Deep Pockets, Debt Defeat and Deadbeats,92 COM. L.J. 275
(1988); Comment, Lender Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 59
U. COLO. L. REV. 659 (1988); Note, SuccessorLiability of FinancialInstitutions Under CERCLA-A Takings and Policy Analysis, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 243 (1988).
4. One commentator has reported that prior to Mirabileno suggestion arose in the legal
literature that financial institutions might be held liable for environmental hazards caused by
the activities of their borrowers. Burcat, EnvironmentalLiability of Creditorw Open Season on
Banks, Creditorsand Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509, 509 n.1 (1986). Banks and
lawyers understandably underestimated the risk of lender liability posed by CERCLA. A
number of other environmental statutes contain liability provisions similar to those in CERCLA, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. No court, however, has held a
lender liable under any of these statutes. See Burkhart, Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title
and Liability, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 317, 321-23 (1988).
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the decision in Mirabile, however, lenders quickly realized that CERCLA
represented an unusual and extreme source of risk to lending.5
In simple terms, the customary risk taken by lenders in making a loan is a
credit risk: the borrower may not have the economic resources to repay the
loan. If the lender takes collateral such as a mortgage to secure the loan,
then credit risk includes a component of collateral risk: the collateral may
not have sufficient value to provide for the repayment of the loan upon a
default by the borrower. CERCLA can increase a lender's credit risk by
charging a borrower with substantial cleanup costs, consequently impairing
the borrower's ability to repay the loan. 6 Of course, countless other statutes
and regulations provide for civil liability and impose this type of credit risk.
CERCLA can also increase a lender's collateral risk by effectively denying a
lender the value of its real property collateral.7 While this collateral risk is
of great concern to lenders, this risk is also posed by various superlien statutes that grant first priority liens to federal or state agencies under certain
circumstances.8 Thus the credit risk and collateral risk provisions of CERCLA, while severe, are not unprecedented in the annals of legislation.
CERCLA represents a unique source of risk to lenders because under certain circumstances the lender may be held liable for the cleanup cost of a
borrower's property. 9 This cost of cleanup may greatly exceed the amount
of the loan, 10 with the consequence that CERCLA can extend a lender's risk
well beyond the dollar amount of its credit risk and collateral risk. 1I This
additional component of risk is profoundly disturbing to lenders who are
accustomed to regarding the risk involved in making a loan as being limited
12
to the amount of the loan.
5. See Berz & Sexton, Superfund Collides with Lenders' Concerns, Legal Times, Dec. 23,
1985, at 13.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). CERCLA also provides for a lien against the property of
any person liable for cleanup costs. This lien is, however, subordinate to security interests
perfected under applicable state law prior to filing by EPA of a lien notice in the appropriate
state office. Id. § 9607(1).
7. See infra notes 54 to 58 and accompanying text.
8. For example, at least six states (New Jersey, Arkansas, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Tennessee) have enacted statutes giving the state a lien on a cleanup site
to secure the repayment of funds used by the state for the cleanup. These liens can take
priority over previously recorded mortgages and other liens. See Gieser, supra note 3, at 69092.
9. See infra notes 38 to 78 and accompanying text.
10. The estimated average cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site is about $26 million.
See Burkhart, supra note 4, at 318 n.3. The cleanup cost of certain sites greatly exceeds this
figure. For example, based upon informal conversations with EPA, the cost of cleanup of the
Stringfellow Acid Pit site in California is about $65 million, while the cost of cleanup of the
dioxin sprayed at Times Beach and Minker Stout-Romaine Creek, Missouri, is about $120
million. To date the cleanup costs at Love Canal have exceeded $250 million. UNITED
STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS SPECIAL MANAGEMENT BULLETIN S-286, ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MITIGATION AND POLICIES OF SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS (July 3, 1989)
[hereinafter U.S. LEAGUE BULLETIN].
11. Id.
12. A lender can certainly lose more than the amount of its loan if it engages in criminal
or tortious conduct. During 1987 alone, juries in three separate cases awarded borrowers over
$100 million in damages in cases involving "lender liability" claims. See 2 LENDER LIABILITY
L. REP. No. 2 (Aug. 1988).
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Since Mirabile, most lenders have dramatically changed their method of
making loans so as to avoid liability under CERCLA. This is particularly
true for lenders who provide financing for real property. Many lending institutions have adopted an environmental risk policy and hired in-house environmental analysts. 13 Lenders commonly require a qualified third party to
perform an environmental audit on the borrower's facility prior to making a
loan. In many instances the borrower must provide updated environmental
audits during the term of the loan.14 Many loan agreements now provide for
the borrower to indemnify the lender against a panoply of environmental
risks, and this obligation is typically set forth as a recourse obligation even
when the obligation of the borrower to repay the loan is nonrecourse. 15 In
addition, when the lender identifies a relatively minor environmental hazard
at the borrower's premises, the lender often requires that a portion of the
loan proceeds be set aside to remove the hazard, and that the borrower or a
qualified third party certify that the hazard has been ameliorated. Such
steps not only help lenders manage their risk under CERCLA, but also exert
a positive influence in the battle to clean up hazardous substances. 16
Unfortunately for borrowers, many lenders do not deem these steps sufficient to limit their liability under CERCLA. The standards for lender liability under CERCLA do not clearly establish the ways by which a lender can
avoid CERCLA liability when making loans to environmentally sensitive
borrowers. Consequently, many lenders are now reluctant to make loans to
borrowers that face even a small possibility of environmental liability. Many
proposed lending transactions have failed to close during the past few years
due to lender concerns about possible CERCLA and other environmental
liability, even when EPA or other authorities have not threatened action
against the borrowers in question. According to recent testimony in Congress, CERCLA has caused lenders to become unwilling to lend to certain
types of businesses such as chemical companies and those located near possible hazardous substance contamination, even without evidence that the borrower poses an environmental risk.' 7 Lenders that might otherwise be
13. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommends these steps in guidelines set forth

for thrift institutions such as savings banks and savings and loan associations. U.S. FEDERAL
16, at 2-3 (Feb. 6, 1989) [hereinafter THRIFT
BULLETIN 16]. An examiner may perceive failure to follow these guidelines as negligence.
U.S. LEAGUE BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 1.
.14. One commentator has argued that Congress intended to encourage banks to require
such environmental audits both before the loan is made and while the loan is outstanding. See
HoME LOAN BANK SYSTEM THRIFr BULLETIN

Tom, Interpretingthe Meaning ofLender ManagementParticipationUnderSection 101 (20)(A)
of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 926 (1989).
15. In certain real estate loans, leveraged leases, and other forms of financing, the borrower may have a "nonrecourse" obligation to repay the loan. In such a case, if the borrower
fails to repay the loan, the lender may not proceed directly against the borrower to recover the

amount unpaid. The lender's sole remedy is to foreclose upon the collateral securing the loan.
16. Lenders occupy a unique position in monitoring the environmental condition of the
property of their borrowers, and consequently lenders are in a position to play a significant role
in the cleanup of hazardous substances. See Tom, supra note 14, at 931-33.
17. See Statement of Sally B. Narey, General Counsel U.S. Small Business Administration, Before the Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 3, 1989)

(statement made in hearings on how lender liability under CERCLA affects small business and
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willing to make these loans are being encouraged not to do so by their regulators. For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has discouraged
thrift institutions from lending to borrowers located in areas with documented evidence of hazardous substance releases. 18 Thus CERCLA may
function primarily to prevent loans from being made to borrowers facing
environmental risks.
The loss of bank financing for environmentally sensitive companies and
industries could cripple not only the economic health of these companies
and industries, but also the ability of these companies and industries to finance needed environmental cleanups. Such a result is particularly unfortunate, given that EPA is increasingly committed to assuring that CERCLA
cleanups be accomplished through private funding. 19 Facilitating the sale
and financing of contaminated properties would substantially assist EPA's
goal of privately funding remedial actions. With the possible, and as yet
unproven, exception of pre-purchase agreements, 20 however, EPA policy
does not yet recognize this fact and EPA has achieved little toward this end.
Financial institutions will continue to have a strong disincentive to lend to
environmentally troubled businesses and industries unless Congress or the
EPA can find a safe harbor for lenders under CERCLA. A bill to amend
CERCLA to include such a provision has been introduced in the House of
Representatives, 2 1 but the prospects for passage of any such amendment
seem remote. 22 Some commentators have sought to interpret the limited
exceptions to strict liability provided under section 107(a) of CERCLA as
providing such a safe harbor, 23 but these exceptions are not likely to give
lenders much comfort without definitive and favorable court interpretation. 24 EPA recently suggested that the availability of purchaser and prepurchase agreements under CERCLA may help provide a more favorable
scheme for lenders. 25 The availability and impact of these agreements are
H.R. 2085, 101st Congress, 1st Session); Statement of the American Banker's Association on

the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and H.R. 2085, Before the U.S. House of Representatives Small Business Committee by
Charles M. Mitchow (Aug. 3, 1989); see also H.R. 2085, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. H1364 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1989) (statement of Rep. LaFalce).
18. THRIFT BULLETIN 16, supra note 13, at 3-4. As interpreted by the authors of this
Article, the criteria set forth in THRIFT BULLETIN 16 recommend against lending to businesses
located in substantial portions of the industrialized cities and counties of California.
19. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE
SUPERFUND PROGRAM 2-1 to -31 (1989).

20. See infra notes 111-153 and accompanying text.
21. Legislation has been proposed in the House of Representatives that would amend
CERCLA to provide that a financial institution could not become liable under CERCLA
solely by foreclosing on real property. H.R. 2085, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC.
H1364 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1989).
22. See [20 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 654-55 (Aug. 11, 1989).
23. See, e.g.. Tom, supra note 14, at 934-43.
24. See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
25. Statement of Glenn L. Unterberger, Associate Enforcement Counsel for Waste, Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Before
the Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 3, 1989)(statement
made in hearings on how lender liability under CERCLA affects small business and H.R.
2085, 101st Congress, 1st Session).
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analyzed later in this Article.26
This Article briefly examines the liability of lenders and others for environmental cleanup under section 107(a) of CERCLA, as well as the statutory exceptions to such liability and the lender liability cases decided to date
under CERCLA. The Article then focuses on EPA's program of purchaser
and pre-purchase agreements to evaluate the program's effectiveness in affording lenders the safe harbor lacking in CERCLA.
I. LIALITY Op

LENDERS UNDER

CERCLA

Congress intended that CERCLA provide a comprehensive program to
address the release or threatened release of hazardous substances. Under
CERCLA, if EPA determines that an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance poses an imminent and substantial danger to the environment, EPA can order the responsible persons to clean up the release or abate
the threat of release. 27 Alternatively, EPA itself can undertake the effort to
clean the site. 28 The Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund, commonly
referred to as the Superfund, 29 may fund EPA's cleanup efforts, and EPA
may seek to recover its cost of cleaning up the site from any one or more of
the following persons under section 107(a) of CERCLA:
30
(1) the owner and operator of the site;
(2) any person who was the owner or operator of the site at the time of
the disposal of the hazardous substances in question;
(3) any person who arranged for disposal or treatment of the hazardous
substances at the site, or who arranged for transport of the hazardous
substances to the site; and
(4) any person who selected the site for disposal or treatment of the
hazardous substances,
and accepted the hazardous substances for trans31
port to the site.
With limited exceptions, 32 any person listed in clauses (1) through (4)
above can be held strictly liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA. Thus,
EPA may charge any person with cleanup costs no matter how cautious or
prudent the person may have been in disposing of or handling the hazardous
substances in question, 33 irrespective of any causal connection between such
person's conduct and the release of the hazardous substances, 34 and (in the
case of a person listed in clauses (1) and (2) above) without regard to
whether such person actually participated in the dispostion or handling of
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra notes 111-153 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
Id. § 9604.
26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988).

30. According to EPA, this provision imposes liability only on the person who owns the

site at the time of the cleanup. See Burkhart, supra note 4, at 327 n.26.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Private parties who have incurred cleanup costs under
CERCLA may, under appropriate circumstances, also bring suit against the persons listed in
§ 9607(a) to recover all or a portion of such cleanup costs. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
32. See infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text.
33. See United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D. Md. 1986).
34. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
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the hazardous substances. 35 In addition, liability under section 107(a) of
CERCLA may be joint and several,3 6 meaning that any one person listed in
clauses (1) through (4) above may be held liable for the entire cost of cleanup
even if others might also have been held responsible under CERCLA. 37
Thus CERCLA section 107(a) does not so much find and apportion fault as
it assures that the cost of cleanup is privately funded by relying upon private
party liability until the deepest pocket is depleted.
In order for a lender to be held liable for the cost of a site cleanup under
section 107(a) of CERCLA, the lender must be a present or former "owner"
or "operator" of the site.38 The following discussion examines each of these
39
potential causes for liability.
A.

"Owner" Liability Under CERCLA

Most case law and scholarly work dealing with CERCLA lender liability
have focused on owner liability under section 107(a) of CERCLA. CERCLA provides that a lender is not an owner of a facility merely by holding
"indicia of ownership primarily to protect [its] security interest" in the facility, so long as the lender does not participate in the management of the facility.40 This provision attempts to treat equally all mortgagees and
beneficiaries under deeds of trust, regardless of whether applicable state law
may deem such persons to hold title to the encumbered property. 4t Consequently, as long as a lender remains simply a passive holder of an encumbrance on a facility, the lender will not be an owner of the facility under
35. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988).
36. See Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
37. Id. Defendants may avoid joint and several liability if they can establish a reasonable
basis for apportioning damages between them. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
38. Courts may hold a lender liable under CERCLA as a person who "arranges for the
treatment or disposal" of a hazardous substance under clause (3) of § 107(a) of CERCLA. 42
U.S.C. §9607 (a)(3) (1988). In Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849
F.2d 1558, 1573-74 (5th Cir. 1988), the court refused to rule that this type of liability is inapplicable to lenders. The court in this case, however, failed to explain how the lender may be
determined to have arranged for such treatment. Clause (3) of CERCLA § 107(a) may prove
significant in deciding liability in United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp. See infra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text. In the absence of a more definitive ruling on lender liability under clause
(3) of § 107(a) of CERCLA, we have focused in this Article on liability as an "owner or
operator" under clauses (1) and (2) of § 107(a) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(1)-(2)
(1988).
39. CERCLA provides a singular definition of the "owner or operator" of a facility as any
person owning, operating, or controlling the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(2)(A) (1988). This definition is hopelessly circular. Consequently, this Article separately analyzes the meaning of
"owner" and "operator." Such an analysis is consistent with the ruling in United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-82 (D. Md. 1986), that a person can be an
owner under CERCLA without being an operator. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying
text.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
41. See Burkhart, supra note 4, at 338-39. This exception should also afford protection
for persons who hold title to real property in connection with a lease financing arrangement.
See id. at 342.
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CERCLA. 4 2
Difficulties arise for a lender when a loan goes into default and the lender
seeks to foreclose on its mortgage or deed of trust encumbering the facility.
At some stage in the foreclosure process, the lender may have taken title to
the facility for reasons falling outside the "indicia of ownership" exception.
Mirabile and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.4 3 illustrate this
danger. In Mirabile, EPA sued American Bank and Trust Company (ABT)
and Mellon Bank to recover the cost of removing hazardous waste from a
paint manufacturing facility that had been financed in part by the two banks.
ABT held a mortgage on the site, eventually foreclosed on the mortgage, and
then made the highest bid at the foreclosure sale. Within four months of its
successful bid, however, ABT assigned its bid to the Mirabiles, the owners of
the site at the time of the lawsuit.
ABT moved for summary judgment on the ground that its successful bid
at the foreclosure sale did not vest legal title in ABT. 44 The court found it
unnecessary to decide this technical issue, stating that ABT's actions between the time of its bid and the assignment to the Mirabiles were "plainly
'45
undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property."
ABT had restricted its actions during this time to securing the site against
vandalism, making inquiries concerning the disposal of drums on the site,
and showing the site to prospective purchasers. Given the limited nature of
these activities, the court held that ABT fell within the exception in CERCLA for lenders holding "indicia of ownership.""4 The court stated that
aspects of the site"
ABT's "participation in the day-to-day operational
47
would have placed ABT outside of this exception.
In contrast, the court in MarylandBank found a foreclosing bank liable as
an owner under facts very similar to those in Mirabile. In MarylandBank
the lender instituted a foreclosure action, purchased the contaminated site at
foreclosure sale with a bid of $381,500, and held title to the site for approximately four years. During this four-year period, EPA initiated and completed the cleanup of the site at a cost of approximately $551,713.50. The
lender attempted to escape liability for the cleanup costs on the ground that
it held title to the site "primarily to protect its security interest" within the
meaning of the secured lender's exception. 48 The district court disagreed,
finding that the exception was intended to protect current mortgagees, not
49
former mortgagees currently holding title purchased at a foreclosure sale.
The court distinguished Mirabile,noting that the court there had found that
42. See discussion of United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., infra notes 48-53 and
accompanying text.
43. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). For an excellent and detailed analysis of Mirabile
and MarylandBank, see Seneker & Townsend, New Liabilitiesfor Lenders: Hazardous Waste
and Toxic Building Materials,LEGAL BULL., July 1987, at 363, 368-74 [hereinafter Seneker].
44. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
45. Id.
46. Id.

47. Id.

48. 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-79 (D. Md. 1986).
49. Id. at 579.
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the lender's purchase of the site in question "was plainly undertaken in an
effort to protect its security interest in the property." 5 0 The court ift
Maryland Bank expressly declined to give Mirabilea broader interpretation. 5 1 In
particular, the court found that a lender could be an owner under CERCLA
without also being an operator.5 2 This finding casts doubt on the Mirabile
holding that a lender must participate in the day-to-day operation of a site
53
before being found to be an owner under CERCLA.
One cannot easily reconcile the rules set forth in Mirabile and Maryland
Bank. While the lender in Mirabile held title for a much shorter period than
did the lender in Maryland Bank, this distinction is meaningless, given the
rule in cases like United States v. Carolawn Co.5 4 that a person can be a
CERCLA owner by holding title for as little as one hour."s In the absence
of a definitive reconciliation between the decisions in Mirabile and Maryland
Bank, most banks have adopted the conservative position that they can remain immune from owner liability only if they refuse to take title to real
property that may be contaminated by hazardous substances. 5 6 Thus Maryland Bank has provided one of the few bright line rules for lenders under
CERCLA: think twice before foreclosing on real property that may become
the site of a CERCLA cleanup.5 7 The application of this rule requires that
unless an exception to CERCLA liability is available, lenders must be prepared to abandon their collateral under certain circumstances.
Lender efforts to avoid owner liability should extend beyond the fear-offoreclosure test. Banks today commonly take warrants, preferred stock, and
other forms of equity from a borrower as partial compensation for providing
financing. These so-called equity kickers may convert a holder of a mortgage into an owner under CERCLA,5 8 especially if a court concludes that
the mortgage holder is receiving income from the property as a result of its
equity interest. In order to fend off this possibility, lenders should perform
an environmental due diligence check prior to accepting any such equity
interest.
50. Id. at 580.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 577.
53. The fact that the lender in Maryland Bank held title to the contaminated site during.

the EPA cleanup, and thus benefitted from the cleanup, distinguishes Mirabilefrom Maryland
Bank. The court in Maryland Bank noted that the exception from liability sought by the
lender "would convert CERCLA into an insurance scheme for financial institutions, protect-

ing them against possible losses due to the security of loans with polluted properties." Id. at
580. In contrast, ABT had no interest in the site at issue in Mirabile at the time of its cleanup.
54. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. 1984).

55. Id. at 20,698-99.
56. See Comment, Fear of Foreclosure: United States v. MarylandBank & Trust Co., 16

Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,165 (1986) (characterizing this position as "fear of
foreclosure").
57. For a more elegant and detailed explanation of this rule, see id. at 10,169 and Seneker,
supra note 43, at 372-74.
58. See Seneker, supra note 43, at 373.
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B.

OperatorLiability

Case law on operator liability under CERCLA is considerably more vague
than the case law discussed above on owner liability. 59 The Mirabile case
provides some instruction on this issue. In Mirabile the court discussed
whether lender Mellon Bank was ineligible for the exception available to
lenders who hold mere "indicia of ownership" to a facility and have not
participated in the management of the facility. 60 The court found an issue of
fact concerning possible participation by Girard Bank, Mellon Bank's predecessor in interest, in the management of the borrower. 6t While the court did
not focus on whether Girard Bank was an owner or operator within the
meaning of CERCLA section 107(a), the facts clearly established that
Girard Bank could not have been an owner of the facility in question.
Girard Bank never held title to the facility or a mortgage or any other lien
on the real property comprising the facility. Thus, the court must have implicitly found a factual basis for holding Girard Bank to be an operator
under CERCLA.
The decision in Mirabile concerning the liability of Mellon Bank was
based upon the court's distinction between participation in financial aspects
of management, which the court deemed too attenuated to permit the imposition of liability, 62 and participation in the "nuts-and-bolts, day-to-day production aspects of the business."'63 There had been testimony at trial that a
Girard Bank officer was present on the site on a regular basis and had become involved in the day-to-day operations of the site, taking actions such as
determining the sequence in which orders were filled and insisting on personnel and manufacturing changes. While the court in Mirabile found this
testimony to be a "slender reed" 64 on which to base liability, it nonetheless
found that the bank's liability under CERCLA presented an issue of fact
precluding summary judgment. 65 Mirabile thus provides some authority for
the conclusion that a lender can avoid operator liability by limiting its participation in the affairs of its borrowers to financial matters.
In the recent decision of United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.66 the court
utilized the Mirabile analysis. The court in Fleet Factors held that a lender's
financial assistance, or even isolated instances of specific, management advice given by a lender to a borrower, are not sufficient bases for lender liability under CERCLA. 67 The court refused to grant the lender's motion for
summary judgment, however, noting that industrial liquidators hired by the
lender may have moved, released, or disturbed hazardous substances on the
59.
60.
61.
62.

See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988); see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997.
Id. at 20,995-97.

63. Id. at 20,995.
64. Id at 20,997.
65. Id. at 20,997. Mellon Bank eventually agreed to a settlement of Mirabile that required
the bank to pay $26,000 of the cleanup costs. 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1263 (1986).
66. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,529 (S.D. Ga. 1988), appealdocketed, No. 898094 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 1989).
67. Id. at 20,531.
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site, or may have permitted ongoing releases to continue in the course of
preparing equipment for sale. 68 While FleetFactorshas received a great deal
of attention, 69 the decision poses no greater risk of lender liability than did
Mirabile. Any person, whether or not a lender, whose agent releases hazardous substances on a site clearly is liable for such release under CERCLA.
Based on the decisions in Mirabile and Fleet Factors,a lender apparently
can avoid operator liability under CERCLA by divorcing itself from the
day-to-day operations of its borrowers, or by limiting its involvement to the
financial affairs of its borrowers. However, there are a number of reasons to
question whether lenders can rely upon the limited involvement test set forth
in Mirabile:
1. Failure to Define "Operator"
Neither Mirabile nor Fleet Factors expressly addresses the meaning of
"operator" under CERCLA. For this reason, a court seeking to define this
term may not restrict itself to the test set forth in Mirabile.
2

EPA Opposition

EPA argued in Fleet Factors that Mirabile was decided incorrectly, and
that in order to avoid operator liability under CERCLA, a secured creditor
may participate in a borrower's financial affairs only to the extent that such
affairs are unrelated to the facility at issue.70 EPA's opposition to the test set
forth in Mirabile may persuade a court to adopt a more restrictive test in this
area.

3. Difficulty of Application
In many cases it will be difficult to determine whether a lender has limited
its involvement in the affairs of a borrower to financial matters. If a lender
merely audits the financial statements of its borrower and requires the borrower to satisfy certain financial covenants, 7 1 CERCLA likely would not
deem the lender to be an operator. But if the lender goes further and actively monitors or supervises the ongoing financial operations of the borrower, the lender will have influenced the operation of the borrower's
business as a whole. The courts would not likely exempt a lender from
CERCLA liability if the lender had prohibited its borrower from spending
68. Id. The court in FleetFactors did not make clear whether it found a potential basis in
fact for "operator" liability under clause (2) of § 107(a) of CERCLA, or for liability as a
generator of hazardous substances under clause (3) of § 107(a) of CERCLA. Id.
69. See Mott & Slaughter, Minimizing Environmental Liability for Lenders: The Most

Common Mistakes, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 949 (Dec. 5, 1988); 2 LENDER LIABILITY L. REP.
No. 9 (March 1989); Forde, Secured Lender Wins Decision in Liability Case; Fleet Unit Not
Responsiblefor Pollution by Customer, American Banker, Jan. 24, 1989; 2 LENDER LIABILITY
L. REP. No. 6 (Dec. 1988).
70. PermissibleScope of Activity at Issuefor Lenders in Eleventh CircuitAppeal, 4 Toxics

L. Rep. (BNA) 411 (Sept. 13, 1989)[hereinafter Appeal].
71. In a typical commercial loan agreement, the lender may require the borrower to meet
ongoing financial tests covering its net worth, working capital, cash flow, net earnings, debt to
worth ratio, and other similar measures of financial health.

19.90]

LENDER LIABILITY

873

any funds on environmental safety. The courts might reach a similar result
when a lender's tight control over the cash flow of a borrower had effectively
prevented the borrower from making expenditures to prevent toxic substance releases. Many forms of asset-based lending give rise to such control
over a borrower's cash flow. For instance, a lender may take a security interest in a borrower's inventory and accounts receivable, and control the
cash flow of the borrower by setting up a lock box account or similar device. 72 Such control might also be found in construction loans, where lenders typically advance construction costs in stages and only after receiving
satisfactory evidence that construction is proceeding as planned. Finally,
such control may exist in workout financing, where lenders typically attempt
to exercise greater control over borrowers
in order to limit the greater risk
73
inherent in this sort of financing.
4. Inconsistent with Due Diligence
The rule of limited involvement suggested by Mirabile conflicts with the
due diligence required to avoid owner liability under Maryland Trust in the
event of foreclosure. 74 By limiting its involvement in its borrower's affairs to
financial matters, a lender may preclude itself from engaging in the due diligence and supervision necessary to monitor and prevent hazardous substance releases that may result in owner liability. As noted above, lenders
secured by real property often require environmental audits of the property
both before the loan is made and during the term of the loan. Such audits
should not, by themselves, constitute the type of involvement that could lead
to liability under Mirabile. If such an audit discloses a problem, however,
then the lender faces a no-win situation. If the lender requires the borrower
to clean up the problem, and especially if the lender monitors or supervises
the cleanup, it may be deemed to have crossed the Mirabile line by participating in the borrower's management. If the lender takes no action, however, the problem may never be corrected, and the lender may face owner
liability upon foreclosure of the site.
72. For example, in Clark Pipe & Supply Co. v. Associated Commercial Corp., 870 F.2d
1022 (5th Cir. 1989), the lender and the borrower entered into an asset-based financing arrangement that required the borrower to deposit all of its collections into a lock box under the
lender's control. The lender advanced the cash to the borrower based on a formula of eligible
inventory and accounts receivable. These cash advances, which were discretionary on the part
of the lender, represented the borrower's sole source of cash. When the business of the borrower began to fail, the lender reduced the advance rate, permitting the borrower sufficient
funds to continue its operations and to sell inventory, the proceeds of which were paid to the
lender under the lock box arrangement. The court held that the lender had exercised its power
in such a way as to prevent the borrower from making payments to its unsecured creditors,
and consequently ordered the lender's claim against the debtor to be equitably subordinated.
Id at 1029-30. For further analysis of this case, see 3 LENDER LIABILiTY L. REP. No. 2 (Aug.
1989).
73. A loan workout is a renegotiation of the terms of an existing loan, where the existing
loan is in default or in danger of default.
74. The "limited involvement" test is also inconsistent with the "appropriate inquiry"
required to claim the innocent purchaser defense to CERCLA liability. See infra notes 91-101
and accompanying text.
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5. Wrongful Failureto Act
EPA apparently has determined to deny the benefit of the Mirabile rule to
any lender that possesses the power to control its borrower, even when this
power was never exercised. For example, in the Fleet Factors appeal, the
United States has claimed that Fleet knew of the presence of hazardous
substances at the facility, "yet rather than remedy the situation, it left the
barrels to rust and leak . . . . 75 The United States also accused Fleet of
wrongful conduct, 76 and this accusation will likely predominate at trial.
However, the accusation that Fleet wrongfully failed to act is potentially
more troubling to lenders, as a doctrine of wrongful failure to act may deny
lenders the ability to avoid CERCLA liability by limiting their involvement
77
with borrowers.
In conclusion, lenders have good reason to worry that making loans to
environmentally sensitive borrowers may lead to operator liability under
CERCLA. The EPA is attacking the suggestion in Mirabile that lenders
may avoid CERCLA liability by limiting their involvement in the day-to-day
affairs of borrowers; 78 and even if this attack should fail, Mirabile does not
set forth clearly the extent to which a lender may become involved in the
affairs of a borrower without risking operator liability. As is the case with
owner liability, a lender can best avoid operator liability under CERCLA by
refusing to make loans to companies that may conceivably be faced with
environmental liability.
C. Exceptions to Owner and OperatorLiability
CERCLA sets forth two primary exceptions to owner and operator liability that are applicable to lenders. 79 The first exception is for lenders that
hold "indicia of ownership primarily to protect [their] security interest" in a
facility and that have not participated in the management of the facility.8 0
As discussed above, this exception applies only to lenders that have not
taken title to the facility after foreclosure and have not intervened in the dayto-day affairs of the borrower operating the facility. The severe limitations
posed by this exception, and the uncertainty of its application, greatly restrict its usefulness.
75. See Appeal supra note 70, at 411.
76. Id. at 412.
77. The United States has pursued its theory of wrongful failure to act in cases such as
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203-04 (E.D. Pa. 1989), in which the government has accused a parent corporation of wrongfully failing to control the activities of its
subsidiary.
78. See Appeal supra note 70, at 411-12.
79. A lender qualifies for a third exception to liability if the lender can prove that the
release of hazardous substances in question was caused solely by an act of God or war. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(l)-(2) (1988). Lenders usually cannot determine the cause of a hazardous
substance release. Lenders usually stumble across hazardous substance contamination as a fait
accompli that may have occurred at any time or at multiple times over a period of years. Thus
lenders face impossible odds in most instances in attempting to prove that the contamination is
due solely to an act of God. For this reason, we have focused our attention on the "good
faith" exception set forth in Id. § 9607(b)(3), which is potentially useful to lenders.
80. Id. § 9601(20)(A).
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The second primary exception to lender liability under CERCLA is the
third-party defense found in section 107(b)(3). 8 t In order to establish the
third-party defense under section 107(b)(3), the lender must show:
(1) that the release of hazardous substances was caused solely by the
act or omission of a third party other than (a) an employee or agent of
the lender or (b) a person whose act or omission occurs "in connection
with a contractual relationship... existing directly or indirectly" with
the lender;
(2) that the lender exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned; and
(3) that the lender took precautions against foreseeable acts or omis82
sions of third parties and the foreseeable consequences of such acts.
The first component of the third-party defense is the most difficult to satisfy, and thus it has received the most attention.8 3 One could argue that in
order to prove that a hazardous substance release was caused solely by the
act or omission of an unrelated third party, it would be necessary to identify
the responsible party. Most lenders would find this piece of detective work
difficult or impossible to accomplish. Fortunately, EPA has interpreted this
provision to require that the lender prove only that it did not itself partici84
pate in or contribute to the release of the hazardous substances in question.
Based on the language in section 107(b)(3), the lender must also prove that
no agent or employee of the lender contributed to such hazardous release.
The sole remaining burden under this component of section 107(b)(3) is to
prove that the lender had no direct or indirect contractual relationship with
any person whose act or omission caused the hazardous substance release.
This component of the third-party defense has generated considerable controversy. In United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.8 5 the court
held that a real property deed could create a contractual relationship under
section 107(b)(3). Consequently, the third-party defense would be unavailable to a purchaser of a contaminated facility from a seller who had caused
the contamination, and to a seller of a contaminated facility where the buyer
subsequently contributes to the contamination.86 EPA has interpreted section 107(b)(3) even more broadly than the court in Hooker Chemicals. According to EPA, any landowner in the chain of title that had caused or
81. Id. § 9607(b)(3).
82. Ide
83. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
84. EPA has stated that the requirements of CERCLA § 107(b)(3) are substantially the
same as the requirements that must be satisfied under CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(B) in order for
EPA to consider a de minimis settlement. EPA Memorandum, Guidance on Landowner Liability under Section 107(a)(l) of CERCLA, De Minimis Settlements under Section
122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated
Property at 7 (1989) [hereinafter EPA Guidance]. Under CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(B), EPA may
settle with a potentially responsible party that did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility, and did
not contribute to the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance at the facility
through any action or omission. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1988).
85. 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
86. Id at 558.
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contributed to the release would be ineligible for the third-party defense.8 7
This interpretation would have rendered the third-party defense virtually
useless to lenders.
Fortunately for lenders, the SARA amendments to CERCLA have added
a definition of "contractual relationship" that has partially resurrected the
third party-defense.8 8 The definition confirms the Hooker Chemicals holding
that a contractual relationship can be created by means of a land contract,
deed, or other contract transferring title or possession.8 9 However, the definition provides that a contractual relationship does not exist if the buyer can
establish that it acquired the site without knowledge or reason to know of
the existence of the hazardous substance at the site.90 This provision has
come to be known as the innocent purchaser defense. To establish eligibility
for this defense, the buyer must show that "at the time of purchase" it made
"all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability." 91 The extent of the inquiry required for this exception
depends in part on the relationship of the purchase price to several variables,
including the value of the property if uncontaminated, 92 commonly known
or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness
of the contamination, the ability to detect the contamination by appropriate
93
inspection, and "any specialized knowledge or experience" of the buyer.
The dictate to consider the buyer's "knowledge or experience" may create
special difficulties for lenders, because lenders are likely to be regarded as
particularly well-suited to spot potential environmental contamination.
EPA has expressly recognized this fact, and has indicated that it will hold
commercial lenders to a higher standard of knowledge than many other
types of property owners. 94 At a minimum, the lender will be expected to
visually inspect the property. 9 5 EPA may also require the lender to hire an
environmental inspector to survey the property for contamination,9 6 and to
examine the chain of title to determine whether the property may have been
owned at one time by a generator of hazardous substances. 97 A lender may
87. EPA Guidance, supra note 84, at 5. Despite the sweeping nature of the EPA pronouncement, any person who sold a site prior to its contamination should not be liable under
CERCLA, since such a person would not have been an owner or operator at the time of the
contamination. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). However, it may be difficult or expensive
for a prior owner to prove that contamination of the site began after the prior owner's sale of
the site.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988).
89. Id. § 9601(35)(A).
90. Id § 9601(35)(A)(i).
91. Id. § 9601(35)(B).
92. Id One commentator has noted that foreclosing lenders may have difficulty satisfying
this provision, given the fact that foreclosure sales are often made at a price below fair market
value. Burkhart, supra note 4, at 354. However, nothing in this statute precludes a court from
factoring into this equation the discount to fair market value inherent in foreclosure sales.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988).
94. See Burkhart, supra note 4, at 355 (discussing the court's holding in MarylandBank).
95. This is the position of EPA. EPA Guidance, supra note 84, at 12 n.l1.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Burkhart, supra note 4, at 352-54.
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also wish to consult the National Priorities List (NPL)98 and similar lists of
contaminated property maintained by state environmental agencies, records
pertaining to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 99 community right-to-know lists maintained in accordance with the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986,100 and discharge
permits. o
The innocent purchaser defense provides the only meaningful defense
available under CERCLA to a lender that has potential liability as an
"owner" or "operator" of a hazardous substance site under CERCLA.
However, a number of severe limitations restrict this defense as applied to
lenders. These limitations are as follows:
1.

High Burden of Proof

The burden of proving eligibility for the defense falls to the person claiming eligibility.' 0 2 Lenders may experience difficulty proving the many elements of the innocent purchaser defense. In particular, the "appropriate
inquiry" required by the SARA amendment' 0 3 may be difficult to
demonstrate.
2. Limited Availability
Lenders with knowledge of the presence of hazardous substances on the
site may not utilize the innocent purchaser defense. 104 In addition, given the
definition of "contractual relationship" provided by the SARA amendments,
lenders that have grounds to suspect the presence of hazardous substances at
the site may forfeit eligibility for this defense.' 0 5 Thus, only lenders that
have inadvertently become the owners or operators of a hazardous substance
site in spite of their exercise of appropriate inquiry may use the defense.
3. Inapplicabilityto Due Diligence at Closing
A lender's exercise of appropriate inquiry at the time a loan is closed and a
mortgage is taken will not bear on the availability of the innocent purchaser
98. The National Priorities List (NPL) is required to be developed by EPA pursuant to

§ 105(a)(8) of CERCLA. It provides the basis for ordering the priority of CERCLA expendi-

tures. No CERCLA funds may be expended on sites not listed on the NPL. I D. STEVOR,
LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE

§ 6.06[21[b]-[c] (1989).

99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988) (commonly known as RCRA). RCRA subtitle C provides for the regulation of ongoing hazardous waste management activities by generators,
transporters, and owners and operators of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. While
RCRA establishes liability for certain activities, it does not pose the same threat of lender
liability as CERCLA. Consequently, a complete discussion of the RCRA liability scheme is
beyond the scope of this Article.
100. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1614 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11005,
11021-11023, and 11041-11050 (1988)).

101.

Gieser, supra note 3, at 682-83 n.194.
102. State v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 531 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (addressing the issue
at the summary judgment stage).
103. See supra note 91.
104. See supra note 90.
105. Id.
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defense, for the SARA amendments require that appropriate inquiry be
made at the time the lender acquires the site in question.10 6 This condition
apparently requires that the lender make its inquiry prior to purchasing the
site at a foreclosure sale.107
4. Limitations on Transferability of Defense
A lender eligible for the innocent purchaser defense may not tranfer its
protected status.108 Each owner or operator of a site must independently
establish its eligibility for the defense. 10 9 Moreover, if an eligible lender
learns of the presence of hazardous substances on a site after taking title, it
must disclose such presence to any prospective buyer of the site,1 10 and such
disclosure would disqualify the prospective buyer from claiming the innocent purchaser defense. Thus, even when the defense is available, the lender
may have no option but to hold the contaminated site until it is cleaned up
by private or EPA action.
In short, the innocent purchaser defense only helps lenders already in
trouble. If the lender has inadvertently taken title to contaminated property,
the innocent purchaser defense may offer the only escape from liability.
Even in such instances, lenders will find the innocent purchaser defense procedurally difficult, given the high burden of proof, and of limited utility,
since the availability of the defense does not allow a lender to sell contaminated property unless the lender has no knowledge of the contamination at
the time of the sale. Moreover, a lender that has knowledge prior to foreclosure that the mortgaged property is contaminated may not avail itself of the
defense.
II.

PURCHASER AND PRE-PURCHASE AGREEMENTS

The EPA guidelines for purchaser and pre-purchase agreements as set
forth in the EPA Guidance'1 I provide the most promising source of a safe
harbor for lender liability under CERCLA. These agreements grew out of
the authority granted to EPA by section 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA,"1 2 which
authorizes EPA to reach settlements involving "only a minor portion of the
response costs" at a facility whenever such a settlement would be "practicable and in the public interest" and would involve "only a minor portion of
the response costs at the facility concerned.""13 Pursuant to this authority,
EPA may enter into two types of settlement: purchaser agreements with
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988).
107. For an argument that "appropriate inquiry" at closing may be sufficient for purposes
of the innocent purchaser defense, see Seneker, supra note 43, at 378-79 n.76.
108. This conclusion follows from the language of § 107(b)(3) of CERCLA, which requires
each person claiming eligibility for the innocent purchaser defense to prove each of the ele-.
ments set forth in note 82 supra and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988).
111. See supra note 84.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l)(B) (1988).
113. Id.
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certain existing landowners and pre-purchase agreements with certain pro14
spective landowners.'
A.

PurchaserAgreements

Purchaser agreements are available only to persons or entities potentially
liable as owners under section 107(a) of CERCLA. 1 5 Under the EPA Guidance, in order for an owner of a contaminated site to be eligible to enter
into a purchaser agreement, the owner must not have (1) conducted or permitted the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any
hazardous substance at the site, (2) contributed to the release or threatened
release of any hazardous substance at the site through any act or omission,
and (3) known or had reason to know that the site was used for the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substances. 1 6 EPA has admitted that these requirements are substantially the
same as those necessary for the innocent purchaser defense under
CERCLA. 117
The EPA Guidance sets forth a model purchaser agreement with EPA."1 8
Based upon this model and the provisions of the EPA Guidance, owners
entering, into such agreements should be prepared to agree to grant EPA
access to the affected site, cooperate in EPA cleanup activities, take due care
with respect to the hazardous substances at the site, and waive any claims
against the United States arising as a result of response activities at the
site. 1t9 Perhaps most importantly, EPA will require that the owner make
cash payments to EPA in order to fund all or a portion of the cleanup costs,
unless the owner makes a "thoroughly convincing demonstration" that it is
eligible for the innocent purchaser defense.1 20 In exchange for the foregoing
covenants and payments, EPA will provide the owner with statutory protection under CERCLA.12 Significantly, EPA grants this protection only to
the owner.' 22 Protection does not extend to a purchaser of the site from the
23

owner. 1

Entering into a purchaser agreement is a relatively complicated procedure. The owner of the site must come forward with information to establish eligibility.1 24 This information includes all evidence relevant to the
actual and constructive knowledge of the owner at the time of acquisition,
including evidence that the owner made the appropriate inquiry required
114. EPA Guidance, supra note 84.

115. The EPA Guidance provisions on purchaser agreements consistently speak of "land-

owner" eligibility for settlement under such agreements. See EPA Guidance, supra note 84, at

9-16.
116. Id at 6-7.
117. Id.
118. Id. attachment I.
119. Id. at 20-21.
120. Id.at 19-20.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id at 21.
Id.
See Sample Administrative Order On Consent attached to id.
at 7, para. 13.
Id.
at 17.
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under the innocent purchaser defense, as well as evidence of the due care
taken by the owner once hazardous substances were discovered. 12 5 The
agreement takes the form either of a judicial consent decree or an administrative order on consent.' 26 All agreements reached with an owner by a
regional office of EPA require the approval of the U.S. Department of Justice, in consultation with the EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement
and Compliance Monitoring and the EPA Assistant Administrator for Solid
Waste and Emergency Response.127 The Federal Register publishes all such
agreements for a thirty-day comment period. 2 8 The EPA may withdraw an
129
agreement on the basis of any comments received.
Purchaser agreements provide lenders with little more protection than
does the innocent purchaser defense. Indeed, a cynic might conclude that
purchaser agreements are simply a tool used by EPA to cause persons innocent of CERCLA liability to contribute to the cost of CERCLA cleanups.
However, these agreements may have some utility for lenders who inadvertently become owners of contaminated facilities. For at least some of these
lenders, the cost of entering into a purchaser agreement may be less than the
cost of establishing an innocent purchaser defense at trial. In addition, by
having CERCLA liability fixed at an early stage, a lender may find it possible to reduce the size of the loss reserve associated with a loan secured by a
contaminated facility.' 30 Finally, lenders may find it advantageous to pay
EPA a certain amount in order to remove the risk that it may be held liable
for a larger amount under CERCLA. Nevertheless, purchaser agreements
suffer from all of the infirmities associated with the innocent purchaser defense: they are procedurally difficult to obtain, are applicable only to lenders
already facing CERCLA liability, and require the lender to wait until EPA
cleans up the site before the lender has a realistic chance to sell the
3
property. 1
B. Pre-PurchaseAgreements
Both the innocent purchaser defense and purchaser agreements provide
limited relief to lenders who innocently and accidentally become, by CERCLA definition, owners of contaminated facilities. In order to establish eligibility for this protection, the lender must have made a comprehensive
environmental investigation prior to foreclosure. Further, the investigation
must have failed to reveal the presence of hazardous substances at the facil125. Id. at 18.
126. Id. at 23.
127. Id. at 24. In addition, the EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring and the EPA Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency
Response must approve the first purchaser agreement negotiated by each EPA region prior to
referral to the U.S. Department of Justice. Id.
128. Id. at 25.
129. Id.
130. See U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Clarificationof Bad Debt Reserve
Policies, Banking Bulletin No. 76-1 (Nov. 16, 1976), reprinted in 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 59,425.
131. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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ity in question. If the investigation reveals the presence of hazardous substances at the site, then neither protection is available and the lender must
consider whether the risk of CERCLA liability outweighs the benefits of
selling the site at a foreclosure sale. The requirement of such analysis raises
a new issue: how to quantify the cost of remedying the conditions identified
by the site assessment, as well as the cost of identifying and satisfying all
government claims for cleanup costs.
Quantifying the liability assumed by a foreclosing lender presents a particularly difficult problem when the source of contamination on the property is
unknown or potentially attributable to many parties. A new type of NPL
site that EPA has begun addressing in the past few years illustrates the problem. These are multi-party and multi-property sites where an entire geographic area is contaminated-a bay, lake, or large underground aquifer, for
example. At these sites, the source of the contamination frequently remains
unknown or the contamination may be attributable to numerous property
owners whose precise degree of responsibility cannot be accurately allocated.
As a result, owners and operators of property adjoining or overlying bodies
of contaminated surface or groundwater are being held responsible, jointly
and severally, for the costs of remedying the contamination. 132 The cleanup
of these sites may involve dozens of parties, tens of millions of dollars in
total costs, and remedial action and liability extending over decades.1 33 A
lender deciding whether to loan or foreclose on such a property cannot easily
determine whether it is assuming a liability amounting to pocket change or
millions of dollars.
Until recently, a lender who discovered contamination in a pre-foreclosure
site assessment essentially had only two options: conclude that the cost of
remediation was small enough to justify foreclosure or write off the loan and
walk away from the property. Prior to issuing the EPA Guidance, EPA
declined numerous requests to enter into pre-purchase agreements that
would provide prospective purchasers with a covenant not to sue in exchange for some benefit provided by the purchaser.1 34 The EPA Guidance
132. For example, at the Motorola site in Arizona, owners of twelve properties are being
asked to remediate contaminated groundwater in the area. California EPA has announced its
intention to order a dozen property owners in Menlo Park, California, to clean up groundwater in the area and to order some 27 companies in the Burbank, California, area to clean up
contamination of the San Fernando Valley Basin-an aquifer of 112,000 acres, which provides
drinking water to parts of Los Angeles. At Commencement Bay near Tacoma, Washington,
over 50 owners of 10 to 12 square miles of shallow water, shoreline, tide flats, and upland areas
have been informed that EPA expects them to finance the cleanup of sediments contaminated
by decades of runoff and disposal. At each of these sites, the total cost of investigation and
remediation is expected to approach or exceed $I00 million. EPA, Commencement BayNear Source--Tie Flats Superfund Sites, General Information Packet for Property Owners
and Businesses (April 1989).
133. IcL

134. In one instance, EPA Headquarters Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring (OCEM) successfully objected to a proposed agreement vigorously supported by EPA Region VIII. The proposed agreement involved two parcels in Denver with an estimated cleanup
cost of only $25,000. The lender for the bankrupt owners of one of the parcels wished to
foreclose during the period that the contamination would be cleaned up if a release from liability could be negotiated with the bank willing to pay the entire cost of cleanup. OCEM's objec-
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now opens the door a crack to such agreements. The words with which
EPA announces its EPA Guidance suggest, however, just how small a crack
this may be: "It is [EPA's] policy not to become involved in private real
estate transactions." 135 Nevertheless, lenders should consider such prepurchase agreements when foreclosure on contaminated property is at issue.
L

Criteriafor Pre-PurchaseAgreements

According to the EPA Guidance, EPA may appropriately consider an
agreement providing prospective purchasers of property with a covenant not
1 36
to sue where at least all of certain enumerated criteria are satisfied.
137
(a) EPA Must Receive a Substantial Benefit Not Otherwise Available.
EPA must receive either a substantial monetary benefit1 38 or the performance of response actions 39 where "performance of or payment for cleanup
would not otherwise be available."' 40 This feature seems to make the prepurchase agreement ideally suited to the foreclosure situation, where the
current owner is unable to repay the loan and thus probably lacks the resources to finance cleanup. To assure that this benefit is actually realized,
EPA requires a showing that the prospective purchaser is financially capable
of performance under the agreement.'41
(b) An Enforcement Action Must Be "Contemplated" by EPA.142 At a
minimum, the site must be listed on the NPL143 or the EPA must have
expended Superfund monies thereon in order for the site to be the subject of
a pre-purchase agreement.'" This requirement limits the current availabil45
ity of such pre-purchase covenants to a few thousand properties at most.
(c) The Operation or Development of the PropertyMust Not Aggravate the
Environmental Problem, Interfere with Cleanup, or Pose a Health Risk to
tions included the positions that no public policy exists for facilitating real estate transactions,

that EPA is biased against encouraging land speculation based on ground rules that would ease
the minds of purchasers with no public benefit (the amount involved was too small), and extension of liability protection to future purchasers would foreclose access to "deep pockets" in the
future, if necessary. This policy debate overlooked the fact that if purchasers are discouraged

from buying property from bankrupt parties because of the liability, the cost of cleanup must
be paid from the Superfund.
135. EPA Guidance, supra note 84, at 25.
136. Id. at 28-31.
137. Id. at 28.
138. Id. EPA does not define the term "substantial." However, experience at one site
where the authors have been negotiating a pre-purchase agreement for a foreclosing lender
may shed some light on this issue. There, eight properties, including the one on which foreclosure is contemplated, share joint liability for the contamination. EPA has asked the lender to
pay well over half the estimated cleanup costs even though the owners of the other properties
are financially viable.
139. EPA Guidance, supra note 84, at 28.
140. Id. at 25.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.

145. There are currently 1175 sites on the proposed NPL. Action, Understanding
Superfund, A ProgressReport, viii (Rand Corporation 1989).
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Those on the Site. 14 6 This condition will probably require that EPA and
others conducting the work be provided with a right of access across the
property, and possibly with a continuing right to inspect the property.
On its face, the EPA Guidance appears to provide a promising vehicle for
removing the obstacles now blocking so many loans, purchases, or foreclosures. Time will reveal whether that promise is realized in implementation.
Much reason for skepticism exists.
Every page of the EPA Guidance evidences EPA's lack of enthusiasm for
these pre-purchase agreements. 147 EPA makes no commitment of any kind
actually to enter such pre-purchase agreements when the applicable criteria
are met, 14 8 promising only to consider doing So. 149 The criteria are tough,
expensive, and inflexible. The EPA Guidance specifies that any agreements
negotiated thereunder must be approved, not only by several EPA divisions
in the Region and at EPA headquarters in Washington, but also by the Attorney General.150 Thus, even if an agreement can be negotiated and approved, the time required for the process may make it impractical for most
transactions. Thus it is not surprising that four months after the issuance of
the EPA Guidance, only one pre-purchase agreement has been entered
into. 51 That single agreement addresses a situation so unique that it provides little insight as to how and whether EPA will respond to more typical
situations.
2.

Use of Pre-PurchaseAgreements by ForeclosingLenders

From EPA's point of view, pre-purchase agreements appear made to order for the foreclosure situation. 152 Presumably, the borrower can no more
easily pay its clean-up costs than repay its loan. The amount paid by the
lender to EPA in a pre-purchase agreement thus would appear to satisfy the
requirement that EPA receive a substantial benefit not otherwise available.
Moreover, since a foreclosure may proceed at a slower pace than a typical
purchase and sale transaction, it may better suit the potentially lengthy
agency review process.
However, two aspects of the EPA pre-purchase agreement program se146. EPA Guidance, supra note 84, at 29.
147. The statement that EPA policy is "not to become involved in private real estate transactions" is repeated twice in the first four pages. Id at 25 and 28.
148. See id. at 25.

149. Id

150. Id at 31.
151. Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue Re: Kellogg Gondola Project Located Within
the Bunker Hill Superfund Site, U.S. E.P.A. Region 10 No. 1089-07-01-122. There, the City
of Kellogg had received a $6.4 million appropriation from the United States Government to
fund the construction of a gondola transport system expected to expand the economy of the
area. The site of the proposed project was within the boundaries of the Bunker Hill Superfund
Site-an area covering several square miles and involving several responsible parties. In exchange for agreements to pave the parking lots for the gondola and grade and encapsulate
areas of contaminated soil at a cost of "at least $10,000," EPA provided a covenant not to sue
to the owners and operators of the gondola. Id.
152. While the EPA Guidance does not define "purchase," nothing suggests that the term
excludes foreclosure.
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verely limit the appeal of this program to lenders. First, as noted above,
EPA will agree to pre-purchase agreements only with respect to facilities
where EPA action is contemplated. This limits the availability of the program to a relatively small number of facilities. Second, and more importantly, EPA apparently will not permit the assignment of the covenant not
to sue contained in the pre-purchase agreement. In a section entitled "Reservation of Rights," the EPA Guidance specifies that "[T]he agreement
should also expressly reserve the Agency's rights to assert all claims and
causes of actions against all persons other than the purchaser." 153 Some
EPA staff members have suggested that if EPA enters into. a pre-purchase
agreement with a foreclosing lender, it will insist on the right to sue subsequent purchasers, the lender's successors-in-interest, over pre-foreclosure environmental conditions.
If EPA limits the benefits of pre-purchase agreement covenants not to sue
to only the party entering into the agreement with EPA, such agreements
will hold little or no appeal to lenders seeking to foreclose upon environmentally contaminated property. Such an agreement would permit a lender to
take title to a facility without risk of CERCLA liability, but would not permit a lender to sell the facility free of such liability. Since a lender's only
interest in foreclosing upon property is to sell the property in order to recoup
all or a portion of its loan, a lender will rarely desire to enter into such an
agreement unless the property can be sold for a material amount, notwithstanding the risk to the purchaser of CERCLA liability. The possibility of
such a sale will be remote in most cases.
EPA's reluctance to allow for the transferability of its pre-purchase agreement covenants not to sue makes little sense on either legal or policy
grounds, at least when the agreement is entered into with a lender. EPA
bases its position on this point on the hope that it can cause the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale, as well as the lender, to contribute to the cost of
cleanup. As noted above, however, such an interpretation provides a foreclosing lender no incentive to enter into a pre-purchase agreement. Without
foreclosure EPA will not even have recourse to the substantial benefit contributed by the lender towards the cost of cleanup. In addition, courts have
not imposed liability for past contamination on a current owner after the
past owner has fully discharged liability for its contribution to such contamination. The EPA Guidance requirement for a reservation of rights against
other persons should thus not be read to include successors-in-interest that
do not themselves cause contamination.
The pre-purchase agreement may prove to be a useful tool for foreclosing
lenders, especially in the absence of legislation or a definitive court decision
providing lenders with some way to foreclose on environmentally contaminated property. However, unless EPA is willing to broaden the number of
facilities eligible for pre-purchase consideration and to extend the covenant
not to sue to cover purchasers at foreclosure sale, the utility of pre-purchase
153. EPA Guidance, supra note 84, at 34. Indeed, the single pre-purchase agreement entered into to date contains precisely such a reservation. See supra note 151.
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agreements will be severely limited.15 4
III.

CONCLUSION

The spectre of lender liability under CERCLA threatens to stop lenders
from making loans with any component of environmental risk. The severe
risk of CERCLA liability, combined with the uncertain nature of the law in
this area, has led many lenders to conclude that there is no safe way to make
loans to environmentally sensitive borrowers. The unfortunate consequences of this conclusion extend not only to many borrowers, but also to
EPA and the taxpayer. Without available bank financing, most CERCLA
cleanups will have to be paid from the Superfund.
In order to reduce the risk of lender liability under CERCLA to an acceptable level, a safe harbor must be found for lenders to lend to borrowers
with potential or actual CERCLA liability. Unfortunately, neither cases
such as Mirabile and Maryland Trust nor the innocent purchaser defense
under CERCLA offer such a safe harbor. The only promising source of such
a safe harbor is the availability of protection under pre-purchase agreements
with EPA. In order for the availability of such agreements to be meaningful
to lenders, however, EPA must broaden the number of facilities eligible for
coverage and extend the protection afforded to purchasers from lenders at
foreclosure.

154. After this article went to press, the court decided Guidice v. BFG Electroplating &
Manufacturing Co., 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1665 (W.D. Pa. 1989). The case is important on
two points. First, it follows MarylandBank, supra note 43, in holding the CERCLA's security
interest exemption does not apply after a lender has foreclosed and taken title. 30 Env't Rep.
(BNA) at 1671. Second, Guidice illustrates the vitality of the rule in Fleet Factors,supra note
66, that "general and even isolated instances of specific management advice" to a debtor will
not automatically void the security interest exemption. In Guidice, National Bank of the Com-

monwealth escaped pre-foreclosure liability even though it had communicated with government agencies respecting its debtor's environmental obligations and provided additional
financing for a partial site cleanup. The court reasoned that a different rule would discourage
monitoring of the environmental compliance status of debtors by lenders and thus run counter

to CERCLA's goal that hazardous substances be handled and disposed of safely. 30 Env't

Rep. (BNA) at 1669, 1670.

